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For those interested in describing and ameliorating racial exclusion and subordination, the work
of John Rawls and his continuing legacy have been sources of frustration. The frustration owes
itself to an inability or an indifference on the part of Rawls and his followers to conduct any
analysis of racial hierarchy. This problem can be understood in different ways deriving from the
methodology laid out in A Theory of Justice. The problem is, critics maintain, that Rawslian
theorizing is preoccupied with abstracting away features of persons in an attempt to determine
the normative character of the basic structure rendering the theory ill-suited to be of any use in
describing or ameliorating racial inequality. The problem shows up in at least four ways.
Charles Mills writes in the Racial Contract
The frustrating problem nonwhites have always had, and continue to have,
with mainstream political theory is not with abstraction itself but with an
idealizing abstraction that abstracts away from the crucial realities of the racial
polity. The shift to the hypothetical, ideal contract encourages and facilitates
this abstraction, since eminently nonideal features of the real world are not
part of the apparatus. There is, then, in a sense, no conceptual point-of-entry
to start talking about the fundamental way in which race structures one‘s life
and affects one‘s life chances (Mills 1997).
Thus, first, the idealizations found within liberal political theorizing present theoretical barriers
to capturing the character of racial exclusion and subordination. And the attack is pushed further
in Blackness Visible while Mills argues that failing to incorporate in any meaningful way the
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history and theoretical significance of racial exclusion not only has the effect of preventing
liberals from capturing the significance of racial exclusion, he also claims that theorizations of
the remedies to address racial exclusion will not become ―theoretically visible‖(Mills 1998Mills
1998). That is, the remedies for unjust distributions of rights and opportunities that owe
themselves to race would not be theorized as remedies to racial injustice because that project
itself presupposes a theoretical account of racial justice. Third, since race is not in the theoretical
vocabulary normative political theory racial justice has to be understood in terms of neutrality.
These features of normative political theorizing create a further problem, namely that failing to
pay attention to features of race has the effect of reproducing injustices (Mills, 1998, p. 108).
Fourth, what is more, Rawls‘s discussion and limitation of the fundamental problem of
social justice, instead of to the actual histories of distributions of rights, resources, and rights, has
the effect of concealing the injustice of the basic structure. So on Rawlsian grounds, Rawls‘s
theory is underdetermined in its effort to remedy the injustices lying within the basic structure by
insufficiently characterizing the extent and the scope of the injustice located within the basic
structure.
To no surprise the discussion of the merits and demerits of the attacks on Rawls and of
the propriety of the Rawlsian enterprise to describe and ameliorate racial inequality has spawned
its own cottage industry.2 And for many individuals, Rawls exemplifies the impotency or
disinterest of the liberal tradition towards racial injustice.
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But the preoccupation with Rawls has blinded us in the profession from thinking more
clearly about post Rawlsian attempts to accommodate the various criticisms that we find against
Rawls. For in other theories we might find modes of theorizing that are not bogged down by
claims about ideal theorizing or preoccupations with societies abstractly construed.
And my aim here is to consider Will Kymlicka‘s work in this vein. Kymlicka‘s work is
clearly in the Rawlsian tradition, as I note below, but Kymlicka seeks to avoid some of the
charges leveled at Rawls and Rawlsian methodology. Kymlicka‘s work is worthwhile for
several reasons. First, his theory is an instance of the ways in which one might bring to bear
non-ideal theorizing to address particular kinds of injustices. This strategy is promising because
it seeks to avoid the problems found in ideal theorizing that have bogged down discussions of the
remedies for marginalized groups.
Second, his work has been prominent as a theoretical justification for actual state
sponsored policies of multiculturalism in Canada. The upshot of this, though this is a point that I
cannot address here fully, is that we can ask about the relationship between actual policies and
the theoretical justifications that might generate them. This is a far more realizable project than
asking abstract questions about the relationship of actual policies to broader theories of the basic
structure as we find in discussions about the relation between, for instance, Rawl‘s difference
principle and affirmative action policies.3 Third, by considering a theory that attempts to
accommodate group rights with individual rights we avoid another source of frustration with
theories such as Rawls, and ipso facto the liberal tradition, namely that his view perpetuates an
antagonistic towards group rights. Fourth, appealing to Kymlicka looks promising because we
can appeal to a mode of theorizing that is self-consciously interested in prescribing social
arrangements that recognize the continuing heterogeneity of nation states. And finally, perhaps
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most importantly, Kymlicka‘s is the only discussion of African-Americans by any of the
―mainstream‖ Anglo-American analytic philosophers.4 Indeed, the recent historical experiences
of black Americans plays a key role in Kymlicka‘s argument in Multicultural Citizenship that
liberal antagonism towards group rights is a recent phenomenon arising from the civil rights era.
If Kymlicka‘s theory accommodates the experiences of black Americans, we will have a
powerful theoretical tool to criticize particular arrangements that ignores the interests of
racialized groups. But also we will have a theory that is sensitive to issues of race.
In what follows I consider Kymlicka‘s discussion of black Americans. And while blackAmericans find themselves near center stage in normative theorizing, Kymlicka‘s diagnosis and
remedies for their disadvantages are mistaken. I argue that he fails to apply his theory where it
applies and his failure to apply the theory derives from mistaken conceptualizations about the
experiences of black-Americans and mistaken conceptualizations within his theory.
I.
Let me begin with a clarification. Although my interest lies in understanding how recent nonideal theorizations offer new ways of conceptualizing particular forms of social injustice, the
remarks I say about Kymlicka‘s view should not be thought to be exhaustive. Kymlicka‘s work
has spawned its own cottage industry and even if one finds his theory plausible in my discussion,
there are a considerable number of objections from the left and from the right towards his theory.
And so insofar as I endorse his general strategy of theorizing particular modes of social injustice,
I do not defend the propriety of using the concept of ―culture‖ to characterize modes of group
differentiated difference in this paper.

I will use the expressions ―African-American‖ and ―black-American‖ interchangeably. And in some cases, to ease
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Kymlicka‘s view seeks to marry liberal principles to social identity.5 It is liberal in that it
recognizes the individual as the primary unit of value and it recognizes the importance of such
values as equality, autonomy, and freedom. Contrary to Rawls, Kymlicka‘s view takes seriously
the role that social identities play in a person‘s ability to flourish and to realize the normative
values that the liberal political theory privileges. Kymlicka‘s commitment to the significance of
social identity is manifested in the self-conscious attempt to combine policies of redistribution
with policies of recognition.6
Kymlicka‘s theory involves abstraction but, unlike Rawls, it is not a project of making
prescriptions from idealized positions. Kymlicka‘s view begins with the idea that individual
lives flourish when left to the choices of the person whose life is being lead, but to make choices
one needs various resources. Among the resources that a persons needs to lead a life of their
choosing one is a context of choice in which various choices are made available and intelligible
to that person. Kymlicka understands this domain under the notion of ―culture‖ to capture the
ways in which one‘s involvement in a social collective is important for the ways in which
persons come to recognize, understand, and makes various choices. The problem is that the
resources required to make effective the cultural conditions in which one chooses effectively are
unequally distributed within liberal nations, putting particular social groups, and subsequently
particular individuals, at risk of failing to flourish in ways that put liberal theory in its most
favorable light. And Kymlicka‘s theory aims to isolate and to remedy these disadvantages.
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Kymlicka‘s theory contains a theory of disadvantage and a set of remedies for that
disadvantage that collectives face in pursuing its interests. The kinds of disadvantages that
attach to collectives attach to collectives in certain formations of which there are principally two,
namely national groups and ethnic groups. National groups correspond roughly to what we
might call nations.7 They are ―more or less institutionally complete‖ enjoying high degrees of
territorial concentration, linguistic particularity, and history.8 Examples of these groups include
Canadian Anglophone, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans. These groups are entitled to
differential citizenship in the form of self-government rights. Such rights secure the full and free
development of the group‘s collective identity by recognizing the group‘s political autonomy or
territorial jurisdiction.9 Under the category of self-government rights, Kymlicka includes
linguistic rights, political veto powers, and land claims.10 National groups are also entitled to
special representation. These rights seek to address the lack of representation in political
decision making and so they guarantee some number of seats set aside for members of the
relevant groups.
Ethnic or immigrant groups in contrast, are not understood in terms of their institutional
complexity but through voluntary immigration.11 These are groups seeking integration into
mainstream institutions. Such groups are typically interested in learning the dominant
language(s) within host states because it allows them to better compete for opportunities and
resources. To promote their own flourishing and to offset disadvantages to the flourishing of
their collective identities culturally defined, these groups seek protection. Kymlicka calls these
Kymlicka himself uses the term ‗culture‘ synonymously with the term ―nation.‖ I don‘t think I misrepresent his
view by using the term ―nation‖ rather than the term‖culture.‖
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protections polyethnic rights. Kymlicka claims that this right entails public funding for cultural
practices and exemptions to known work rules. These rights are meant to promote the
integration of immigrants into dominant institutions.12
These are the main pieces of Kymlicka‘s theory. The next question is to determine
whether and how black Americans fit in the theory. That is to say, to determine what remedies
are appropriate to alleviate the disadvantages of black Americans we need to determine whether
they fit into the Kymlickian typology.
Start with national group status. A collective is a national group if it enjoys high degrees
of institutional presence and if it culturally seeks to keep its collective identity. These features
provide evidence of a collective narrative identity. Neither of these features are satisfied by
black Americans. In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka claimed that black Americans did not
desire, and I think we can infer, did not actively fight for the institutional features that satisfy the
requirements of national group status. And as per institutional concentration, nor did black
Americans possess the kind of territorial concentration, historical features, and language that
might have allowed them to develop in ways similar to paradigmatic national groups.
In his later work, Politics in the Vernacular, Kymlicka corrects himself and notes that
owing to the exclusion of blacks from dominant institutions, e.g. Jim Crow, many black
Americans experienced institutional separation from whites showing many of the features
exemplified by national groups: distinct schools, hospitals, churches, organizations, and financial
institutions.13 But even after making this concession, Kymlicka refuses to assign self-
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government rights to black Americans, arguing that black Americans did not choose their
separate existence, this was put upon them by exclusion.
If we can‘t demarcate a collective black identity by appeal to institutional features, can
we demarcate black American identity culturally? Kymlicka thinks not. Kymlicka claims that
the original African slaves did not share a common language and culture and that the common
culture that black Americans now share is distinctly ‗American.‘ Subsequently, black Americans
lack the features constitutive of being a distinct society. And on Kymlicka‘s view, we can infer
that the rights that attach to that status would be inappropriate for black Americans.
Next, consider the immigrant model and the rights and powers associated with it. Groups
fitting this status are defined by their voluntary immigration and an interest in joining the larger
political community. The barriers they face are barriers of access to dominant mainstream
institutions. Kymlicka claims that black Americans did not voluntarily seek to become members
of the new world. What is more, when African slaves were brought to the United States they
were prevented from integrating into mainstream institutions and the many different culturally
demarcated African collective traits were neither preserved nor consolidated into a common
culturally demarcated collective.14
It seems that the main reason for excluding them from this category is that policies of
integrating blacks into dominant institutions have been blocked. The virulent character of
institutionalized racism has foreclosed the possibility of moving into mainstream positions and
statuses in society. And so Kymlicka infers, following other social theorists that a new model of
integration needs to be articulated to capture the experiences of black Americans.
Kymlicka therefore takes his theory to be of little use in explicating the disadvantage and
of addressing the injustices black Americans face. But in admitting this Kymlicka‘s view
14
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remains unclear. We don‘t know whether this concession means that the right to determine the
character of the collective identity through culturally defined protections are inappropriate or
whether such rights are inefficacious in bringing about or promoting access to dominant
institutions. Perhaps Kymlicka‘s view would be clearer if he had critically considered whether
the protections he considered, e.g. polyethnic rights or special representation rights, have an
effect on the disadvantages black Americans experience. But Kymlicka does not and so we are
left thinking that black Americans strike out on both accounts on his theory.
II.
But this analysis seems mistaken. One problem lies with the ascription conditions for the
typology. For instance, where he excludes black Americans on the grounds that they do not want
self-government, Kymlicka ignores the fact that separation and nationalism have been defining
features of African-American political thought.15 Nor does he take seriously enough the separate
status that black Americans had as an instantiation of his view. Kymlicka attempts to deflate the
status of their self-government claiming that they were forced into such a position, but other
collectives, such as indigenous groups who have similarly been refused entrance into mainstream
institutions, but enjoy self government status, remain unquestioned.
Second, Kymlicka‘s typology poorly reflects the communicative innovations that
influence the discursive properties that the view requires. Kymlicka conceives of nations as
collectives that occupy territorially contiguous spaces, but this picture is best suited for
collections of individuals with fewer means of communication. In prior eras, living in close
proximity to members of one‘s social group mattered because it ensured better access to comembers and to the events of one‘s community. In short, collective agency and coordination
See Boxill, Bernard (1992-1993). ―Two traditions in African-American Philosophy.‖ Philosophy Forum 24(1-3),
119-135.
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problems were tractable with members in close quarters. But recent technology in the form of
television, print media, cell phones, and the internet extend public spheres and members of
collectives can organize and communicate effectively with fewer face to face meetings. What
this suggests is that the conception of National groups sharing a contiguous space needs to be reinterpreted and needs re-mapping onto the various new and burgeoning discursive public spheres
(churches, suburbs, exurbs, etc.). For if he had done so in the case of black Americans he would
have found numerous and multiple sites, churches, blogospheres, barbershops and hair salons to
name a few, where black Americans routinely meet and display the features of the kind of
ongoing construction of a collective identity that Kymlicka‘s view seeks to capture.
Third, Kymlicka‘s emphasis on culture as a necessary and sufficient condition for
inclusion in the theory is problematic. This worry cuts across both categories of the theory.
Recall that Kymlicka granted self-government rights when a collective possess a collective
identity, culturally defined. This idea seems important for the immigrant model though it
voluntariness is prior in the analysis. As I presented earlier, according to Kymlicka, blackAmericans fail to display culturally demarcated collective traits, but for those that are effectively
‗American.‘ But one might resist such a claim. Kymlicka does not consider whether the various
Africans tribes formed over time and via the institution of slavery, Jim Crow, and Christianity,
forged a common and unique collective of individuals, an imagined community with an
overlapping consensus of culturally demarcated traits and properties. To claim that black
American culture is simply American culture fails to note the contributions of black Americans
to American culture and reflects parochial conceptions of black American and American culture.
It is also sociologically and anthropologically naïve. Now if Kymlicka means that American
culture includes black American culture in the way that Canadian culture includes Quebecois and
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Inuit culture, then the claim is trivially true. But I suspect that he means the reductionist claim
that black Americans have no distinct culture and as I said, even a brief survey of black
American history will locate the presence of a distinct culture. So where the culture seems to
matter for the theory, black-Americans satisfy the ascriptions conditions.
But more importantly, the presence of culture is not morally relevant for the normative
project. What matters from the moral point of view a narrative identity with fixed points of
historical significance and rituals that reflect the various values and goods of the collective. This
is evidence that a group is autonomous. The fixed points of historical significance reflect the
presence of a collective conception of the good that the collective seeks to enact, not a particular
set of practices or performances.
Kymlicka‘s exclusion of black Americans is also equally problematic when we consider
his typology of immigrant groups. Recall on this category, collectives that voluntarily immigrant
to a new host country and seek to enter the host country‘s mainstream institutions are granted
various rights. But black Americans did not voluntarily immigrate and have been denied access
to mainstream institutions. Kymlicka is correct to note that black Americans (still) seek to
integrate into dominant institutions even though they did not voluntarily immigrant to the New
World. But Kymlicka locates the voluntaries of immigration in the wrong place and on mistaken
grounds. What should matter from the moral point of view is that black-Americans have been
invited to live as moral equals. Of course they were invited to the New World as chattel slavery,
but one might infer, from the legal abolition of chattel slavery, that the US invited those black
Africans on its soil to live as moral equals. The invitation of course, remains unfulfilled. But the
normative point seems clear. The invitation of host states to would be-immigrants is what
provides the justification for the rights Kymlicka offers, not the fact that immigrants
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―volunteered‖ to leave or that they have demarcated collective cultural traits that are distinct
from the dominant culture.
So I disagree with Kymlicka that black-Americans do not have the right kind of culturally
demarcated traits and properties that make for inclusion into the theory. But I also deny that the
possession of these properties should be necessary or sufficient for inclusion into the theory.
III.
Kymlicka‘s attempt to capture the disadvantages facing black Americans is problematic and it
suggests a more general weakness in his theory to capture ethnocultural and ethnoracial
disadvantage. Where the theory is problematic is in its application and in some of its underlying
assumptions. Kymlicka‘s theory is not bogged down by idealizations and by creating a theory
that applies to bare persons devoid of a history and tradition.
But while I think various underlying assumptions appear to be mistaken, they can be rethought and perhaps put to use to aid those of us thinking about remedies for racial exclusion and
subordination. Given the ways in which racial exclusion and subordination morph or intersect
with other axes such a project would be welcomed. But if the reader is not convinced of these
claims, one perhaps finds some amount of solace in knowing that Kymlicka‘s discussion of the
experiences of black Americans puts him well beyond the work of John Rawls.
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